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Abstract 
There is an ongoing debate concerning the disparity between the public and private sectors in 
relation to construction waste management (CWM) performance: some argue that CWM 
performance between the two sectors should have no difference since they are under the 
governance of the same set of CWM related regulations, while others argue that public sector 
clients should perform better as they are subject to greater social scrutiny. Previous studies 
comparing CWM performance have suffered from insufficient quality data, leaving the debate on 
the CWM performance disparity largely inconclusive. Informed by the Coase Invariant Theorem, 
this research empirically compares CWM performance between public and private projects. It does 
so by using big data in the form of 2 million waste disposal records generated from around 5,700 
projects undertaken in Hong Kong during 2011 and 2012. It is found that there is a notable CWM 
performance disparity between the public and private sectors, with contractors performing better in 
managing both inert and non-inert waste in public projects than they do in private projects. 
Furthermore, the interviews and case studies conducted as part of the research suggest that CWM 
transaction costs are not high enough to incentivize contractors to manage waste conscientiously 
and therefore other institutional arrangements, such as promoting the value of environment 
protection leadership, are critical for achieving superior CWM performance. The research 
therefore supports the corollary of Coase Invariant Theorem, which asserts that certain forms of 
institutions would improve CWM performance by reducing transaction cost even though both 
sectors are subject to the same set of CWM-related formal public policies.  
 
Keywords: Construction and demolition waste, construction waste management, waste generation 
rate, performance, Coase Invariant Theorem, big data 
 
Introduction 
Either public or private clients sponsor construction work. The public sector, in the form of 
government departments and their subsidiaries, not only manage the economy and set and 
maintain standards for the construction industry, but also acts directly as a client for construction 
works (Hillebrandt, 1974) by developing institutional premises such as town halls, governmental 
offices, schools, hospitals, and public housing. Owing to the large size of its budgets and of the 
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complexities involved, the public sector is seen as indispensable to developing infrastructure 
projects for transport, energy, telecommunications, and water. In contrast, the private sector is 
primarily involved in the development of real estate such as private offices and residential 
buildings. In recent years, private client organizations have been increasingly involved in 
construction works that were traditionally developed by their public counterparts; this is known as 
public private partnership (PPP), which is defined by the U.S. National Council	 the National 
Council for PPP (2014) as “a contractual arrangement between a public sector agency and a 
private sector entity … in delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public”.  
 
There is an ongoing debate over whether public sector clients perform better than their private 
counterparts in CWM, or vice versa. One may argue that as public clients are subject to higher 
social and political control, they are less likely to practice illegal dumping and should therefore 
perform better in CWM than private clients. This presumption is partly supported by Tam et al. 
(2007), who discovered that private clients involved in private housing and private commercial 
projects tend to produce the highest wastage levels when compared with other types of projects. 
Hong Kong Advisory Council on the Environment’s (ACE’s) (2007) documents highlighted the 
two sectors separately in terms of CWM measures. Poon et al. (2013) explained further that public 
sector projects in Hong Kong have imposed more stringent contractual clauses to reduce waste 
generation and often provided financial incentives for waste reduction; while private sector 
projects emphasize time and cost efficiency. Under the Coase Invariant Theorem, as applied to 
construction management by Lai et al. (2008), there should be no difference in the performance 
between contractors working for different types of clients. This corollary of the Coase Invariant 
Theorem, which assumes zero transaction costs, speculates that even though construction clients 
from both sectors are regulated by the same set of CWM public policies and tend to hire 
contractors from the same labor pool, they would behave differently. However, the presumption of 
the difference in CWM performance between public and private sector client-contractor 
relationships has rarely been tested by empirical studies, despite its importance to not only do 
justices to contractors but also provide a useful reference for authorities when enacting and 
enforcing CWM-related public policies.  
 
Moreover, research on CWM performance has commonly suffered from insufficient quality data to 
support an informed debate on CWM performance. Most of the empirical studies on CWM 
performance, measured by waste generation rate (WGR), have a relatively small sample or 
sampled relatively small sites due to the difficulties involved in conducting a survey on large-scale 
projects (Katz and Baum, 2011, Dahlbo et al., 2015). For example: Lu et al. (2011) measured 
waste generation in floor areas cordoned off by site managers in four sampled construction sites in 
Shenzhen, China, and revealed a WGR of 3.275–8.791 kg/m2; Formoso et al. (2002) investigated 
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the occurrence of material waste at 74 building sites located in different regions in Brazil with an 
average WGR of 27.6%; Tam et al. (2007) found a WGR of 15-27% through interviewing 
construction professionals at 19 sites in Hong Kong; and Yuan (2013) carried out a strength, 
weakness, opportunity, and threat analysis of CWM using data derived from governmental reports, 
waste management related regulations, literature review, and focus group meetings. Owing to the 
small samples, it is not surprising to see WGRs varying greatly from one study to another without 
any form of convergence. Results of such studies cannot therefore be utilized with a high level of 
confidence to substantiate the speculation that public sector clients perform better in CWM than 
their private sector counterparts, or the opposite. 
 
This paper reports on the findings of an empirical study that seeks to test the hypothesis of the 
disparity of CWM performance between the public and private sectors. The research is 
contextualized in Hong Kong where a large set of data that has become available recently. This 
‘big data’ covered around 5,764 sites, large and small, scattered over Hong Kong, which produced 
2,212,026 waste generation/disposal records in the two consecutive years of 2011 and 2012. 
According to the Law of Large Numbers, the average of the results obtained from a large number 
of trials should converge to a certain value as more trials are performed (Sen and Singer, 1993). It 
is conjectured that the CWM performance of the public and private sectors could converge with 
big data and that it could provide a fuller picture of CWM in various projects, based on which 
more reliable conclusions can be drawn. The result shows there being a considerable disparity of 
CWM performance between the public and private sectors. It is further discovered that CWM 
transaction costs are not high enough to force contractors to undertake CWM conscientiously and 
therefore other institutional arrangements are critical for achieving superior CWM performance. 
This research provides empirical evidence to support the corollary of Coase Invariant Theorem. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured into five sections. Pursuant to this introductory section is 
an elaboration of the main concepts, including construction waste, waste management performance, 
and waste generation rate. Section 4 elaborates the theoretical lens for the paper, which is the 
Coase Invariant Theorem as applied to construction management by Lai et al. (2008). Section 5 
describes a detailed description of the methodology. Big data is utilized to elucidate the CWM 
performance between the two sectors by examining different types of projects. Interviews and site 
visits were conducted to help understand the reasons behind the performance disparity. The sixth 
section presents the results, discussion, and findings. Conclusions and implications for further 
research are given in Section 7.  
 
Construction and demolition waste 
Construction and demolition (C&D) waste, sometimes simply called construction waste, is defined 
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as the waste that arises from construction, renovation, and demolition activities (Kofoworola and 
Gheewala, 2009). It may include surplus and damaged products and materials arising in the course 
of construction work or used temporarily during the process of on-site activities (Roche and 
Hegarty, 2006). In Hong Kong, both terms are used to represent the surplus materials generated by 
site clearance, excavation, construction, refurbishment, renovation, demolition, and road works 
(Lu and Yuan, 2011).  In this paper, the terms ‘construction waste’ and ‘C&D waste’ are used 
interchangeably to represent inclusively material waste from all construction activities without 
confining to a certain stage of construction, renovation, or demolition. Although C&D waste is 
often included as one of the forms of municipal solid waste (MSW), C&D waste is considered 
heterogeneous when compared to general MSW (e.g. household waste) or other industrial solid 
waste (ISW) (e.g. hospital waste or electronic equipment) (Lu et al., 2011). Construction is an 
environmentally unfriendly activity. Its waste often constitutes a prodigious portion of the total 
MSW that contributes to degradation of the environment (Lu and Tam, 2013; Boiral and Henri, 
2012; Coelho and de Brito, 2012). 
 
Construction waste can also be classified according to its composition. The European Waste 
Catalogue (EWC) classifies construction waste into eight categories such as concrete, bricks, tiles 
and ceramics; wood, glass and plastic; bituminous mixtures, coal tar and tarred products; metals, 
soil, stones and dredging spoil; insulation materials and asbestos-containing construction 
materials; etc. In Hong Kong, the composition of construction waste is divided into the two major 
categories: inert construction waste (ICW) and non-inert construction waste (non-ICW) (EPD, 
2005). Lu (2013a) views the inert and non-inert dichotomy as a philosophy underlying the CWM 
system in Hong Kong, including its policies, regulations, and practices. The ICW comprises soft 
inert materials such as soil, earth, silt, slurry as well as hard inert materials such as rocks and 
broken concrete, while the non-inert materials include metals, timber, plastics and packaging waste 
(EPD, 2005). Owing to its inertia, non-combustibility, and less odorous nature, ICW can be used 
for land reclamation and site formation, and thus its negative impact on the natural environment is 
theoretically negligible (Lu, 2013a). The non-ICW is disposed of in landfills, which take the 
valuable land space in Hong Kong. Anaerobic degradation of this waste creates water, air and soil 
pollution by the production of CO2 and methane. Citizens normally adopt a Not-In-My-Back-Yard 
(NIMBY) stance in siting these CWM facilities. It is therefore of paramount importance to manage 
construction waste properly and its performance should be unambiguously measured and closely 
monitored.  
 
Waste generation rate (WGR) as a performance indicator 
Waste generation rate (WGR) is widely used as an indicator to measure construction waste 
management (CWM) performance. WGR can be calculated by dividing the waste in volume (m3) 
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or quantity (tons) by either the amount of virgin materials purchased, or the amount required by 
the design, or per m2 of gross floor area (GFA) (Formoso et al., 2002). Methodologies adopted for 
obtaining data for estimating WGRs are diverse and typically include: direct observation (Poon et 
al., 2001); comparing contractors’ records (Skoyles, 1976); questionnaire and telephone survey 
(McGregor et al., 1993); sorting and weighing the waste materials on site (Bossink and Brouwers, 
1996); collecting data through consultation with construction company employees (Treloar et al., 
2003; Tam et al., 2007); and tape measurement and truck load records (Poon et al., 2001, 2004). 
There are two prevailing approaches: classifying waste materials into different categories, or 
treating them as a whole. Many studies (e.g. Bossink and Brouwers, 1996; Treloar et al., 2003) 
investigated WGRs by differentiating material waste, while others (e.g. Poon et al., 2004) 
investigated C&D waste by treating the waste stream as a whole. All the studies derived a general 
rate such as volume (m3) or quantity (tons) of waste generated per m2 of GFA. 
 
In view of the fact that not every project has a GFA but that they all have a contract sum, this 
research introduces a new WGR indicator: 
WGR=Waste quantity/contract sum (ton/million US$)                       Equation (a) 
This indicates the level of waste generation in producing every million US$’s worth of 
construction work. By using this indicator, it is possible to compare CWM performance across 
non-building projects (e.g. roads, and civil engineering development), which do not have a GFA as 
the denominator in the WGR equation. Ideally, secondary objective data should be used to 
calculate this WGR indicator to increase the accountability of the CWM performance 
measurement. Moreover, the data should be big enough to enable the calculation of a convergent 
WGR that can be accepted with a high level of confidence. It is well known that construction 
projects differ significantly from one project to another, each having a relatively long period for 
construction works. An empirical measurement of CWM performance, if just probing into a 
certain project or a certain window of time of the project, should be treated with caution when it is 
to be generalized to other projects.  
 
WGR, as an indicator of CWM performance, is considered the consequence of different causal 
factors. Bossink and Brouwers (1996) suggested that the factors include different construction 
techniques, work procedures, and common practices. By investigating WGR, one can link the 
CWM performance to these causal factors and provide quantitative information for benchmarking 
CWM practices across different projects (Lu et al., 2011). Lu and Tam (2014) used WGR and 
conducted an inter-jurisdiction analysis of the relationships between CWM performance and these 
causal factors. The underlying thinking of their study was that the causal factors would be different 
from one economy to another, which in turn explains the CWM performance disparity. The 
presumption is that the causal factors are the same intra-jurisdictionally, as they are fostered by 
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certain profiles that epitomize the jurisdiction (e.g. CWM related strategies, regulations, and public 
policies). Nevertheless, CWM performance disparity caused by client-contractor relationships, 
even within the same jurisdiction, has been noticed (Tam et al., 2007) and increasingly debated by 
practitioners and policy-makers, although it has received scant attention from researchers.  
 
The Coase Invariant Theorem applied to CWM  
The theoretical lens for the paper is the Coase Invariant Theorem as applied to construction 
management by Lai et al. (2008). The Coase Theorem, first expressed by Stigler (1987), has two 
versions that can be labeled as the ‘Invariant Theorem’ and the ‘Optimality Theorem’ (Cheung, 
1991). According to Lai et al. (2008), the Invariant Theorem can be described as: “Given: (a) zero 
transaction cost, and (b) clearly defined property rights, resource allocation would be identical 
irrespective of (and therefore ‘invariant’ to) the [way] rights and liabilities are assigned”. In other 
words, the pattern of input allocation and mix, output mix and the like would not be affected by 
the applicable pattern of rights and obligations. However, it is hard to find the two antecedents in 
reality, and the Coase Theorem is thus often criticized for being almost always inapplicable in 
economic reality. Partly for dealing with the logical fallacy of previous arguments denying the 
applicability of the Coase Theorem, Lai et al. (2008) developed the corollary of the invariant 
theorem “Where transaction cost is not zero or property rights are unclear or poorly defined, the 
assignment (pattern) of rights and liabilities would affect (the pattern of) resource allocation”. 
While it is true that zero transaction cost and clearly defined property rights cannot be found in 
reality, the corollary helps examine which ‘assignment (pattern) of rights and liabilities’ (e.g. the 
law, governance and institutions, and contractual arrangements) will improve/reduce efficiency in 
allocating resources (e.g. qualities and qualities of input and output) through reducing/increasing 
transaction costs. The Coase Invariant Theorem thus provides the theoretical lens for examining 
potential CWM performance disparity with a view to identifying the ‘assignment (pattern) of 
rights and liabilities’ that reduces transaction cost and/or improves efficiency of CWM. 
 
By transposing Coase’s wheat farming and cattle raising examples to CWM, the relevant input 
becomes the money, labor, and machinery necessary to reduce, reuse, recycle, and finally dispose 
of C&D waste, while the output is the inert or non-inert C&D waste that will be disposed of at 
government waste management facilities such as landfills and public fills. CWM can be perceived 
as a production function, the only difference being that the more resources allocated, the less 
output will be produced and the better the CWM performance will be. Given its negative impacts 
to the natural environment, as a public good, construction waste is often heavily regulated by 
authorities using public policies (Lu and Tam, 2013). Government should enhance their role: 
enforcement of environmental law and furtherance of using construction waste as raw material for 
manufacture (Rodríguez et al., 2014). Here, ‘public policy’ is an inclusive term, which may 
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comprise CWM related ordinances, regulations, codes of practice, and initiatives introduced by 
government or its executive arms. The orthodox wisdom is that contractors, which are the 
perceived polluters who are responsible for the waste generated, should all behave the same under 
the same set of CWM public policies. Therefore, the main hypothesis is: 
 
H1: There is no disparity of construction waste management (CWM) performance between the 
public and private projects 
 
If the hypothesis is denied using big data and more robust methodological instruments, 
explanations to the disparity should be sought by examining the institutional arrangement that 
reduce/increase transaction costs. 
 
Research methodology 
The ‘big data’ for comparing waste generation rates 
Based on the ‘polluter pays principle’, a Construction Waste Disposal Charging Scheme 
(CWDCS) has been enacted in Hong Kong since 2006. In line with the CWDCS, a construction 
contractor is charged HK$ 125 for every ton of non-inert construction waste (non-ICW) it disposes 
in landfills; HK$ 100 per ton for mixed inert construction waste (ICW) and non-ICW accepted by 
off-site sorting facilities (OSFs); and HK$ 27 per ton of waste consisting entirely of ICW accepted 
by public fill reception facilities (PFRFs). By following the CWDCS, contractors have to dispose 
of their construction waste at designated government facilities, if not otherwise properly reused. 
For every truck of construction waste received at the facilities, the Hong Kong Environmental 
Protection Department (HKEPD) records the information. This practice leads to around 1.1 million 
disposal records per year, which form the ‘big data’ recording the project properties, client types, 
and waste disposals in a well-structured manner (see Fig. 1 for an excerpt of the data). For 
example, the big data recorded that a certain vehicle (labelled by vehicle plate no.) transported a 
certain amount of construction waste (weight-in, weight-out, and net weight) in a certain time 
(time-in, and time-out) to a specific facility.  
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Fig. 1 Screenshot of some typical transaction records in the set of ‘big data’ 
 
The waste is generated from various projects, each with a unique billing account number linking 
the disposal record to the specific project. Big data is composed of digital information, including 
unstructured and multi-structured data, often derived from interactions between people and 
machines such as web applications, social networks, genomics, and sensors (Arthur, 2013). 
According to Cappucio (2010), big data has the characteristics of volume, velocity, and variety: 
volume means large quantities of data, usually larger than that can be processed using traditional 
tools; velocity means that data have an ongoing flow and a fast speed coming into the organization; 
and variety in big data is that traditional structured data are now able to be joined with semi-
structured and unstructured data. All these characteristics are evident in the waste disposal records. 
 
Data analysis 
Through analyzing big data, researchers aim at identifying some ‘latent knowledge’ (Agrawal, 
2006) or ‘actionable information’ (WEF, 2010), which can be incorporated in future decision-
making. Aside from the technical and methodological challenges, one premise of using big data is 
that the larger data volume will alleviate the potential bias in small data and provide a fuller 
picture so as to have a closer claim on objective truth. While the ability to gather, store, access, 
and analyze data has grown exponentially over the past decade (Shah et al., 2012), processing big 
data does not mean disregarding traditional methodologies such as statistical analyses or data 
mining (Kantardzic, 2003; Fayyad, 1996; Clifton, 2010); too often, articles on big data 
misleadingly associate it with buzzwords such as pattern finding algorithms, unattended machine 
learning, or artificial intelligence. In this research, the big volume of data is examined by 
traditional simple statistical analyses to find out whether there is a CWM performance disparity 
between public and private projects. These include the analyses of their distributions (e.g. normal 
distributions or skewed distributions), means, medians, and standard deviations using R, which is 
an open source statistical analytical software program (R Development Core Team, 2008) 
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Interviews and field studies 
Case studies were conducted to provide qualitative date to deepen the understanding of CWM 
practices in Hong Kong gleaned from the big data analyses. Similar to the tenet underlying big 
data thinking, in choosing the case projects, they should be sizable ones with a relatively long 
period of construction time to allow for a comprehensive investigation of CWM practices. The 
project types should be representative and the interviewees should have ten years of experience in 
managing construction waste. From the information provided in Table 1, it can be seen that four of 
the case study projects were buildings while the rest were infrastructure projects. Five of the 
projects were sponsored by public clients, including Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) (e.g., 
public housing), the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) (e.g., tunnel and stations), and the 
Architecture Services Department (ASD) (e.g., schools, offices, and other institutional buildings). 
Each case study was conducted by three research assistants who made non-participant 
observations on the construction site and asked questions of interviewees concerning actual CWM 
behavior (e.g., reduction, reuse, recycling, and disposal) and their perception of current CWM 
practices in Hong Kong’s construction industry. One may notice the diverse descriptions of the 
roles who were designated for CWM in Hong Kong; this reflects the industry’s struggle with 
designing a post called waste manager. Interview questions were organized surrounding aspects 
including their daily CWM practices, the major concerns (e.g. costs), their solutions (e.g. 3R), and 
their suggestions to the Government. Costs and benefits are critical data to be solicited but the 
former was not specifically classified as production cost or transaction cost. It is unfair to let the 
practitioners to understand the terminology. These interviews and field studies provided valuable 
insights from senior players as qualitative data to be triangulated with the data from the statistical 
analyses and the case studies. 
 
Table 1 Profile of the surveyed case studies 
Project 
No.  
Project type Public/ 
Private 
Contract 
Sum 
(HK$) 
Interviewee Date of Survey 
A MTRC Tunnel (civil) Public 28,105 
million 
Safety manager 19 September 
2013 
B Superstructure of New 
public housing 
(building) 
Public 102.343 
million 
Site manager 23 October 2013 
C MTRC (building 
services) 
Public 272 million Site safety manager 
and public 
relationship (PR) staff 
26 November 
2013 
D New Public building Public 213 million Site manager 14 March 2014 
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(foundation) 
E MTR station (building) Public Unknown Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) 
and sustainability 
manager 
15 November 
2013 
F Private building 
renovation (M&R) 
Private Less than 1 
million 
Foreman 15 April 2014 
 
Data analyses and results 
Project profile: public and private compared 
Fig. 2 shows that in the two years of 2011 and 2012, a total of 5,764 projects disposed of 
construction waste in various government CWM facilities. They left over 2,212,026 waste disposal 
records (see Fig. 1) in the HKEPD, which form the ‘big data’ for comparing CWM performance 
between the private and public sectors. Amongst them, 1,084 (19%) were public projects and 
3,143 (54%) were private projects. A large number of projects (1,537 or 27%) were classified as 
‘unclear’ and not used as part of the analyses because they only had a billing account without 
specific linkages to a public or private client and did not have any specific project information 
(e.g. project type, GFA, or contract sum). The reason for this is that, in order to save transaction 
costs for minor construction works of less than HK$ 1 million, one waste disposal account can be 
used for a number of contracts without the need for contract details to be submitted by the account 
applicants. Specific project information was thus only available for construction contracts with a 
value of HK$ 1 million or more. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Number of projects by sectors that disposed of C&D waste in 2011 and 2012 
 
Fig. 3 illustrates the contract sums of the public and private projects that have disposed of waste in 
government CWM facilities in 2011 and 2012. Judging by their total contract sums, the private 
sector initiated more than half of the projects but the average contract sum of the public sector 
projects (266.82 b/1,084) is larger than that of the private sector projects (330.25 b/3,143). This is 
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in accord with the belief that Hong Kong’s construction industry, in one of the freest market 
economies in the world (Friedman and Friedman, 1990), has both a strong public and private 
sector (Lu, 2013b). This also supports the generally held belief that public sector clients mainly 
sponsor complex, large budget projects. 
 
Fig. 3 Contract sums (billion HK$) of projects by sector that disposed of C&D waste in 2011 and 
2012 
Fig. 4 further illustrates in detail the distribution of different types of projects in the private and 
public sectors. It comes as no surprise that private sector clients are primarily involved in building 
development (163.35b, 49% of the total private projects, Fig. 4[a]) while their public counterparts 
are mainly involved in civil works (113.96b, 43% of the total public projects, Fig. 4 [b]). However, 
it is somewhat surprising to see that the private sector in Hong Kong is also heavily involved in 
civil works (49.05b, 15% of the total private projects, Fig. 4[a]), e.g. the linking facilities between 
MTR stations and their estate villages. Both sectors had a considerable portion of foundation 
works (70.93b for the private and 34.64b for the public sector) and maintenance and renovation 
(M&R) works (41.66b for the private and 43.23b for the public sector).  
 
(a) The private sector (b) The public sector 
	
Fig. 4 Contract sums of projects that disposed of C&D waste in 2011 and 2012 
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Overall WGRs of private and public projects 
Noise reduction was accomplished by removing projects with unreasonable WGRs, which resulted 
in ten projects with a WGR larger than 10,000 t/mHK$ being removed from the dataset, leaving 
4,217 projects in the sample. The calculations of WGRs are all based on the new sample profiles 
as shown in Table 2 below. Fig. 5 is an illustration of the WGRs of all 4,217 projects in 2011 and 
2012 by sector. The figure was produced by first calculating the WGRs of individual projects 
using Equation (a), and then plotting the WGRs in a 2D axis system. It can be seen that the 
majority of WGRs fall in a range of 0.1 to 100 t/mHK$ and are randomly dispersed with no 
discernable pattern. 
 
Table 2 New project profiles after noise reduction (Private vs Public) 
  
Private Public 
Project number Contract sum (b HK$) Project number Contract sum (b HK$)
Building 504 163.35 122 65.02  
Civil 197 49.04 319 113.96  
Demolition 242 2.09 39 1.71  
Foundation 428 70.93 121 34.64  
M&R 1,693 41.66 426 43.23  
Others 69 3.16 57 8.26  
Total 3,133 330.24 1,084 266.82  
 
 
Fig. 5 WGRs of private and public projects 
 
Fig. 6 presents the WGRs by ranking them from the smallest to the largest within their respective 
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sectors and plotting them in the same 2D axis system. The result is not two continuous curves, but 
rather 4,217 discrete dots, each representing the WGR of a specific project. The total number of 
projects (4,217), private projects (3,133), and public projects (1,084) all remains unchanged but 
the WGRs are organized in a more orderly fashion. For the best case, a private project generated 
virtually no waste at all while for the worst case a private project generated 7,115 ton of 
construction waste in producing every million HK$’s worth of construction work. For the public 
projects, the best case project generated virtually no waste while the worst case project generated 
4,648 ton of construction waste in producing every million HK$’s worth of construction work.  
 
 
Fig. 6 WGRs in 2011 and 2012 ranked (private vs public) 
 
Fig. 7 is a histogram of WGRs for overall, private, and public projects created by using R. The 
means of WGRs and the standard deviations (SD) of the projects in Table 3. It can be seen from 
Fig. 7 that the curves are far from a Normal Distribution but very close to a Skewed Distribution. 
This encourages us to try the three Skewed Distributions as the Log-Normal Distributions using R. 
At the core of the trials is the natural logarithm of WGR, i.e., ln(WGR). Fig. 8 shows the 
histograms of the ln(WGR) for private, public, and overall projects, which tend to be Normal 
Distributions. Most ln(WGR)s are concentrated around the median of ln(WGR)s, which means 
most WGRs are scattered around the median of WGRs in a Log-Normal or similar to Log-Normal 
Distribution. Based on the process to try the Skewed Distributions as the Log-Normal 
Distributions, the median of private WGRs is 14.31 t/mHK$, while that of the public is estimated 
as 17.97 t/mHK$ by using ݁௟௡	ሺௐீோሻ (see Table 3). 
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Fig. 7 Histogram of WGRs of overall, private, and public projects 
 
Fig. 8 Histogram of ln(WGR)s of overall, private, and public projects 
 
Table 3 Means, medians of WGRs and standard deviations (SD) of private and public projects 
Project Sample size (N) Mean of WGRs Standard Deviation (SD) Median of WGRs (t/mHK$) 
Private  3,133 75.48 179.49 14.31 
Public  1,084 53.26 117.47 17.97 
 
One notable result is the large disparity between the means of WGRs and medians of WGRs as 
derived from both private and public projects. When it is a normal distribution, mean is median, 
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and it is legitimate to use mean as a measure of the average value of a sample. However, simply 
using means without considering the distribution of the sample could be very misleading to 
understand average CWM performance, as evidenced by the large disparity between the two (see 
Table 3). Another notable result is that, without the big data to allow for a comprehensive 
examination of a large number of projects over a relatively long period (two years in this case), the 
resulting WGRs could also be very misleading for understanding average CWM performance. An 
empirical study, if measuring WGRs only in a limited number of projects in a confined area 
cordoned off, or in a short period of time (i.e. examining a very limited number of histograms in 
Fig. 7), is inherently limited by its failure to account for other truths or a totality of truth. In 
contrast, using the big data and robust statistical methods, it is sufficient to examine all the projects 
and derive a more reliable average WGR. In this study, the median, 14.31 t/mHK$ describes the 
WGR level of private projects, and 17.97 t/mHK$ reflects that of public projects. Judging from 
this, it is evident that the private sector is doing better than its public counterpart in managing 
C&D waste. Hypothesis H1 is thus denied. 
 
Inert and non-inert WGRs of private and public projects by production sectors 
It could be argued that the foregoing analyses is over simplified since the two sectors have 
different project profiles that will generate different amounts of inert and non-inert construction 
waste, which is considered by existing CWM systems as having different impacts on the 
environment, landfills and public fill space. In light of this contention, the data was subsequently 
examined in greater detail. Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 are the distributions of natural logarithms of non-
inert and inert WGRs, i.e. ln(WGRnon-inert) and ln(WGRinert) for each type of projects, namely, (a) 
building, (b) civil, (c) demolition, (d) foundation, (e) M&R, and (f) others. These distributions are 
either Normal Distributions or similar. Therefore, medians instead of means are used to estimate 
the average CWM performance of each type of projects. Mood’s median, as a non-parametric test, 
is used to test the equality of medians from two or more populations. If the p-value of Mood’s 
median test is small, the two populations have a significant distinction in terms of their medians. 
Usually, a p-value of 0.05 is used as the criterion of significance in Mood’s test. The test results 
are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Fig. 9 (a) Distribution of ln(WGRnon-inert)s of private and public building projects        Fig. 9 (b) Distribution of ln(WGRnon-inert)s of private and public civil projects 
 
    
Fig. 9 (c) Distribution of ln(WGRnon-inert)s of private and public demolition projects       Fig. 9 (d) Distribution of ln(WGRnon-inert)s of private and public foundation projects 
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Fig. 9 (e) Distribution of ln(WGRnon-inert)s of private and public M&R projects       Fig. 9 (f) Distribution of ln(WGRnon-inert)s of private and public other projects 
 
	
 
 
Fig. 10 (a) Distribution of ln(WGRinert)s of private and public building projects             Fig. 10 (b) Distribution of ln(WGRinert)s of private and public civil projects 
 
	 18
 
Fig. 10 (c) Distribution of ln(WGRinert)s of private and public demolition projects           Fig. 10 (d) Distribution of ln(WGRinert)s of private and public foundation projects 
    
Fig. 10 (e) Distribution of ln(WGRinert)s of private and public M&R projects                  Fig. 10 (f) Distribution of ln(WGRinert)s of private and public other projects 
 
Table 4 Comparison of non-inert WGRs between private and public projects 
Projects Median WGR (t/mHK$) Median difference 
(private-public) 
Mood's test 
Private Public p-value Significant difference? (Y/N) 
Building 3.50 2.30 1.20 0.02 Y 
Civil 1.46 0.90 0.55 0.20 N 
Demolition 8.30 7.47 0.82 1.00 N 
Foundation 0.54 1.14 -0.60 0.00 Y 
M&R 5.29 2.77 2.53 0.00 Y 
Others 4.55 0.94 3.62 0.00 Y 
 
As shown in Table 4, the public sector outperformed its private counterpart in managing non-inert 
C&D waste in almost all types of projects (Medianprivate-Medianpublic>0, the larger the median, the 
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worse of the CWM performance) except for foundation works, although statistically there is no 
significant performance difference between the public and private sectors in managing non-inert 
C&D waste from civil and demolition works. This seems contradictory to the results above, which 
revealed that overall the private sector is performing better than their public counterpart in 
managing C&D waste.  
 
Bearing in mind that inert C&D waste takes a large proportion of the total construction waste, this 
research further examines the performance disparity of managing inert waste between the two 
sectors. Table 5 shows that again the public sector outperformed the private sector in managing 
inert construction waste from civil, demolition, foundation, and other works (Medianprivate-
Medianpublic>0) but not so in building and M&R works (Medianprivate-Medianpublic<0). By 
interpreting the WGRs in Tables 4 and 5 in conjunction with the project profiles in Table 2, it can 
be seen that the private sector performed better in the large volume of building and M&R works, 
which consequently skewed the total sample and led to the conclusion that overall the private 
sector performed better than the public sector in managing C&D waste. Once again, Hypothesis 
H1 is unsupported. 
 
Table 5 Comparison of inert WGRs between private and public projects 
Projects 
Median WGR (t/mHK$) Median difference 
(private-public) 
Mood's test 
Private Public p-value Significant difference? (Y/N) 
Building 6.84 27.47 -20.63 0.00 Y 
Civil 36.87 21.32 15.55 0.01 Y 
Demolition 546.15 39.36 506.79 0.00 Y 
Foundation 79.08 40.41 38.67 0.03 Y 
M&R 5.31 15.25 -9.94 0.00 Y 
Others 15.89 10.65 5.24 0.40 N 
 
Based on the detailed analyses of the big data, the full story is that: (1) there is a notable CWM 
performance disparity between the public and private sectors; (2) overall, the private sector 
performed better in managing C&D waste; (3) contractors’ CWM performance is better in 
conducting the large volume of private building and M&R works; and (4) contractors tend to 
perform better in managing both inert and non-inert waste when they undertake other types of 
public projects.  
 
Discussion 
Previous studies have reported that the behavior of contractors in Hong Kong changes in line with 
CWM public policies, particularly after implementation of the CWDCS (Lu, 2013b; Lu and Tam, 
2013). For example, to save waste disposal levies, contractors paid more attention to construction 
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waste reduction, reuse, and recycling (3R) before the residual waste is unavoidably disposed of at 
landfills (Hao et al., 2008). Construction waste is often a mixture of inert and non-inert material, 
although it is advisable to segregate the two and send them to different destinations instead of 
disposing them of as a whole. Poon et al. (2001) found that construction contractors were reluctant 
to carry out on-site waste sorting, in spite of the perceived advantages of doing so. By taking Poon 
et al.’s (2001) study as a point of departure, Yuan et al. (2013) reported contractors’ change of 
behavior in relation to on-site sorting. Owing to the confined construction sites and/or high labor 
costs, contractors may send a mixture of inert and non-inert construction waste to offsite sorting 
facilities that charge less than the cost of disposing of it at landfills (Lu and Yuan, 2012).  
 
Based on the analyses of the set of secondary big data, it is intriguing to discover that the same 
pool of contractors performed differently in CWM after they entered into different contractor-
client relationships. It is against orthodox wisdom that contractors should behave the same under 
the same set of CWM public policies. However, the Coase Invariant Theorem can explain the 
performance disparity. The disparity is a result of different resource allocations that is caused by 
higher social scrutiny and closer monitoring. Probably owing to the widespread awareness of the 
impact of non-inert waste on the environment and valuable landfills, contractors deliberately 
allocate resources to deal with it. Therefore, the absolute difference between the two sectors is not 
great (see Table 4). This performance disparity is also observed in managing inert construction 
waste. One of the interviewees, who is a contractor, reflected that public projects receive higher 
social scrutiny in construction waste management. These public projects should show leadership in 
environmental management. Yet, in private projects, efficiency of materializing the physical 
project is the business mantra. While this is by no means something that should be criticized in a 
commercial society like Hong Kong, contractors generally pay less attention to CWM, which 
compete for resources against the main trades in materializing the project. Certain forms of 
institutions would improve CWM performance, although both the private and public sectors are 
under the same set of public policy CWM regulations. 
 
CWM, which is viewed as a production function, involves not only production costs (e.g. the labor 
allocated to the 3Rs) but also various kinds of transaction costs. Voice from the industry 
complained that the current CWDCS has not considered the heavy transportation cost to transport 
the waste from a site to the government facilities; the cost per trip could be higher than the waste 
disposal levy itself. Enforcement of policies for encouraging better CWM performance has never 
been costless. An enhanced trip-ticket system (TTS) is used to ensure that all construction waste 
generated by public construction works is properly disposed of through tracking the waste 
destination (Lu and Yuan, 2012). Even with this enhanced TTS, there are allegations of illegal 
dumping, i.e. dumping construction waste in undesignated places so as to avoid the waste disposal 
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levies.	 The illegal dumping of waste has been a serious environmental concern (Ichinose and 
Yamamoto, 2011). To better monitor potential illegal dumping, HKHA, as the government public 
housing developer, is working with Hong Kong Construction Industry Council (CIC) to tag all 
lorries with tracking technologies (e.g. Radio Frequency Identification and Global Positioning 
System). The interviewees in this study implied that the public sector has less incentive to be 
involved in illegal dumping. 
 
Another example of how transaction cost impacts CWM performance can be seen from the 
performance disparity of managing demolition and foundation works between the private and 
public sectors (see Table 5). Public clients have a large pool of projects, which allow some of the 
ICW generated from one project to be reused in another (e.g. for backfilling). Conversely, private 
clients, as various individual profit centers, have higher cost to search for the ICW demand and 
supply information. More often than not, they just simply transport the ICW to government waste 
reception facilities without adequately considering other options.  
 
With all the potential production and transaction costs numerated, they still take only a small 
portion of the overall cost of materializing a construction project. Conscious minimization of 
construction waste so as to save waste disposal levies is rarely high on a contractor’s agenda, 
particularly in Hong Kong where projects often have a very tight schedule. It is not the intention of 
this research to suggest increasing waste disposal levies, although the stakeholders of CWM in 
Hong Kong is seriously considering this option. Instead, findings from the analyses suggest that 
with non-zero transaction cost, some slightly different ‘assignment of rights and liabilities’ (e.g. 
closer social scrutiny and monitoring of contractors) could significantly impact CWM 
performance, even though both the public and private sectors are subject to the same laws and 
regulations. 
 
Conclusion 
Through a thorough examination of the waste disposal records 4,227 sizable construction projects 
in Hong Kong over a period of two years, it is discovered there is a notable disparity of 
construction waste management (CWM) performance between the public and private sectors. This 
is against orthodox wisdom that contractors should behave the same under the same set of CWM 
public policies regardless of the sector that employs them. However, this can be explained by the 
Coase Invariant Theorem, which asserts that certain forms of institution would influence CWM 
performance by changing transaction costs even though both sectors are subject to the same set of 
formal public policies. It is revealed in this study that clients’ strive to be environmental protection 
leaders, and consequently monitor their contractors’ CWM practices closely, which clearly makes 
a significant difference to contractors’ CWM performance. This research thus provides meaningful 
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insights into CWM policy-making by finding that more attention needs to be paid to latent 
institutional arrangements in order to improve the effectiveness of public policies. Exploring 
tailor-made public policies that can further enhance CWM performance in both the public and 
private sectors are thus highly recommended for future research. 
 
Big data showed its strength in this research by providing a fuller picture, based on which a closer 
claim on the objective truth can been made; which is, overall contractors tend to perform better in 
managing construction waste when they undertake private sector projects. They particularly 
perform better in managing waste generated from private building, and maintenance and 
renovation works but no so evident in other types of public projects. Big data research in CWM is 
still in its infancy with many challenges ahead, two of which are how to derive secondary, 
objective big data, and how to process it to mine latent knowledge or ‘actionable information’ 
using more robust approaches. It is, however, envisaged that more CWM studies using big data 
will be undertaken in the future given the booming data processing technologies around the world. 
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